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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
KELLY LAXTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 990076-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1998). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue on Appeal. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it sentenced 
defendant to three indeterminate prison terms of one-to-fifteen years, to be served 
consecutively, for his conviction on three counts of distribution of a controlled substance? 
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely 
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); see 
also State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). Accordingly, the appellate 
court will not overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it finds an abuse of 
1 
discretion. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 
1997). An abuse of discretion may be found if the sentencing is inherently unfair, is clearly 
excessive, or is imposed without considering all legally relevant factors. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d at 651. Nevertheless, the court "may find an abuse of discretion only if [it] concludefs] 
that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following statute is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998): 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
* * * 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged by separate informations with three counts of distribution of 
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
2 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)(Supp. 1998). 181R.4; 182R. 1; 183R. I.1 Following a preliminary 
hearing on all three charges, defendant was bound over for trial. 181R. 16; 182R. 16; 183R. 
16. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to three reduced counts of 
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. 181R. 20-27,36-37. The trial 
court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each of the 
offenses. 181R. 36-38. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. 181R. 39. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS2 
In August 1998, a detective from the Moab Police Department made arrangements for 
two confidential informants to purchase methamphetamine from defendant. 181R. 1; 182R. 
2; 183R. 2. Over the course of five days, the confidential informants made three controlled 
purchases of methamphetamine from defendant. In the first of these controlled buys, the 
confidential informants purchased from defendant .50 grams of methamphetamine for 
$40.00. 182R. 2-3; PSI at 2. In the second controlled buy, they purchased from defendant 
lThe record on appeal includes the individual files for each of the three separate 
cases filed under Case Nos. 9817-181, 9817-182, and 9817-183 respectively. 
Accordingly, citation to the record will identify the record by the last three digits of the 
respective case number, e.g., 181R., 182R., and 183R. 
2Although a preliminary hearing was held prior to defendant's plea to reduced 
charges, a transcript of the hearing was not made part of the record on appeal, nor was a 
transcript of the change of plea hearing made a part of the record. Accordingly, the facts 
cited herein are primarily taken from the probable cause statements supporting 
defendant's arrest warrants and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), a copy of 
which is attached in Addendum A. Both the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the 
PSI are identified at page 47 of the record. Accordingly, citation to the presentence report 
will be "PSI" followed by the page number, e.g., PSI at 3. Citation to the transcript, a 
copy of which is found in Addendum B, will be TOS followed by the page number, e.g., 
TOSatlO. 
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another .50 grams of methamphetamine for $50.00. 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2. In the third 
controlled buy, the confidential informants purchased from defendant 1.75 grams of 
methamphetamine for $120.00. 181R. 1-2; PSI at 2. Each of the purchases were made at 
defendant's Moab residence, which was located within a drug-free zone. 181R. 1-2; 182R. 
2-3; 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's imposition of consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for 
three counts of distribution of a controlled substance was reasonable and within the court's 
broad discretion. Even with the imposition of consecutive prison terms, defendant still faced 
a minimum prison sentence of only three years—two years less than had he been sentenced 
for even one first degree felony, for which there was ample evidence. Moreover, the 
sentencing judge duly considered the gravity and circumstances of the offense, together with 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of defendant, as required by statute. In light 
of those factors, the court's sentence was reasonable and within its broad discretion. In short, 
it cannot be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS 
FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion 
•"of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 6S1 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant 
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has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose 
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not 
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1998). 
Although the courts have opined that Utah's sentencing statute favors concurrent 
sentencing, see State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993),3 an appellate court will not 
overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it is clear that the trial court abused its 
discretion. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. As the supreme court 
in Gerrard observed, "[t]o do otherwise would have a chilling effect on the trial court which 
has the main responsibility for sentencing." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. An abuse of 
discretion may be found if the trial court fails to consider the statutory factors or if the 
sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair or clearly excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
However, an "appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
3In so observing, the supreme court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) which 
provides: "Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. 
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A review of the record in this case reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion 
in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each of the 
three counts to which he pleaded guilty. The consecutive terms were reasonable not only in 
light of the statutory factors, but also in light of the sentence that defendant otherwise would 
have served had he been convicted on the first degree felonies. 
A. The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing Consecutive Prison Terms of 
One-to-Fifteen Years for Distribution of a Controlled Substance Was 
Reasonable. 
Defendant was originally charged with three counts of distribution of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. 18IR. 4; 182R. 1; 183R. 1. As such, he 
faced indeterminate sentences of five years to life on each count. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(4)(Supp. 1998); § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1998). However, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant 
pled guilty to three reduced charges of distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony. 181R. 20-27. Accordingly, rather than facing a sentence of up to fifteen years to life 
if convicted on the first degree felonies, defendant received a sentence that was the 
equivalent of three to forty-five years in prison. 181R. 36-38. Even //defendant had 
received concurrent prison terms on the first degree felonies or had been convicted of only 
one first degree felony, he still would have faced a prison term of five years to life. 
Considering the heavy sentences defendant was facing if convicted as charged, it 
cannot be said "that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Defendant admitted to selling the methamphetamine in each case. 
18 IR. 21. Although defendant pled to reduced charges, that he sold the methamphetamine 
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within a drug-free zone was never in dispute. See 181R. 33 (Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Concurrent Sentences) ("Although he was arrested for distributing in a school 
zone, as that is where his home was located, . . . ."). In light of this fact, imposition of 
consecutive terms, resulting in a minimum prison term of only three years—two years less 
than what he would have served had he been convicted of just one first degree felony—was 
reasonable and within the discretion of the court. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985) (observing that facts relating to dismissed charges are properly considered at 
sentencing); see also State v. Hines, 663 So.2d 199, 202 (La. App. 1996) (observing that a 
trial court may consider a plea bargain when imposing sentence). 
B. The Trial Courts Properly Considered AH Legally Relevant Factors 
in Sentencing. 
As noted above, section 76-3-401(4) requires the court to "consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Failure to consider these factors can result in an abuse of discretion. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d at 651. However, the statute requires only that the court consider these factors, not 
that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see also State v. Howell, 
707 P.2d 115,118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing judge will give considerable weight 
to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other factors."); State v. Nutall, 
861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing 
more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). As such, "the 
exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court," 
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which endeavors to impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and law before it." 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record in this case reveals that the trial court duly 
considered all statutory factors and acted within its discretion in imposing the sentence. The 
parties did not request the preparation of a PSI. 181R. 34. However, after the prosecution 
requested consecutive sentences, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the preparation 
of a presentence report. Docket Minute Entry, December 23, 1998.4 The PSI not only 
provided information regarding the gravity and circumstances of the offense, but also 
regarding defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs. After considering the 
information in the report, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences. 
1. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity and 
Circumstances of the Offense. 
As set forth in the Statements of Probable Cause and in the PSI, defendant sold 
methamphetamine to confidential informants on three separate occasions within a five-day 
period. 181R. 1-2; 182R. 2-3; 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2. As noted above, each sale occurred at 
a residence located within a drug-free zone, a fact which subjected defendant to first degree 
felony charges carrying a prison term of five years to life. Id. 
Defendant has characterized the offense as "victimless." Aplt. Brf. at 15. Such a 
conclusion, however, ignores the tremendous detrimental impact of drug abuse. While those 
who purchase methamphetamine may be "willing" victims, they are nevertheless "harmed" 
4The docket, which is found in the files in the record, was not given a page 
number. 
. " " • 8 ' 
when they purchase and use the drug.5 Methamphetamine, which defendant admitted selling, 
181R. 21, is a Schedule II controlled substance under both state and federal law. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (Supp. 1998); 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c) (1981).6 Schedule II drugs 
have a "high potential for abuse/9 which "may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence." 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(2). Moreover, the United States Congress has 
concluded that the illegal distribution and improper use of these and other controlled 
substances "have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare" of 
the public. Id. at § 801(2). In a real sense, therefore, the sale of methamphetamine is 
anything but a "victimless" crime. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's History. 
Defendant objects, as an "obvious display of bias," to the PSI's comment that he had 
"been arrested and charged with offenses which include violence, possession of a weapon, 
and assault with a weapon, indicating a propensity for violent behavior, even though 
prosecution has been declined on some of the offenses.'" Aplt. Brf. at 13 (quoting PSI at 
10). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the PSI accurately reported his criminal record. The 
PSI referenced three "violent" offenses, and indicated that "some" did not result in 
5A victim has been defined as "[o]ne harmed by or made to suffer from an act." 
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 1286 (1988). 
6The schedules in the Utah Controlled Substances Act are nearly identical to the 
schedules in the federal Controlled Substances Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 
with 21 U.S.C.A. 812; see also State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 914 n. 4 (Utah App. 1990) 
(noting that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-1 to -21 
(Supp. 1998), incorporates the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801 to 
904(1981)). 
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prosecution. Accordingly the trial court could only conclude that defendant was convicted 
of only one such offense. The PSI specifically set forth the dispositions of these offenses in 
the section listing defendant's adult record. PSI at 5. Although he was not convicted of the 
weapons-related offenses, defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault. PSI at 5. 
Defendant emphasizes that "he is not a threat to society" because he has never been 
prosecuted for any other crimes of violence or that involve a weapon. Aplt. Brf. at 13 n. 1 
(emphasis in original). Such a claim denies the course of his life. In addition to the domestic 
violence conviction, and as discussed infra, at 11-12, defendant has been convicted of 
burglary of a dwelling, two DUI-related offenses, and several thefts. Having now also added 
to his criminal record three convictions for distribution of a controlled substance, defendant 
does, in fact, represent a threat to society. 
Even had the contract investigator improperly concluded that defendant's arrest record 
demonstrated a propensity for violence, the record reveals that the trial court did not rely on 
these unprosecuted arrests in imposing sentence. The court gave the following reasons for 
its decision to impose consecutive prison terms: 
The reason I'm ordering consecutive sentences, rather than concurrent 
sentences, which are usually presumed, is that the Defendant has been 
sentenced to prison on three previous occasions and, apparently, either served 
out his time or persuaded authorities that he would not resume criminal 
activity once he was released from prison and, yet, the evidence is that each 
time he has resumed criminal activity. And so, it's pretty clear that with Mr. 
Laxton, we're in a situation where we just have to keep him in prison as long 
as we can. . . . I think it's important to state, with respect to this Defendant, 
who's going back to prison now for the fourth time, that we want them to keep 
him there, at least give him a priority for keeping him in there. 
10 
According to the matrix, even with this, he will spend four and a half 
years in prison with this sentence, and that is not too much, given his history. 
TOS at 8. Accordingly, the trial court relied not on defendant's arrest record, but on his 
conviction record and his consistent return to criminal behavior notwithstanding several stays 
in the Utah State Prison. Therefore, defendant's "view that the trial judge was unduly 
influenced by [his] arrest record is purely speculative," State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984,986 
(Utah 1986), especially in light of defendant's conviction record and the fact that he is likely 
to serve AVi years based on the matrix. TOS at 8. 
The PSI revealed a lengthy criminal history. Defendant reported that he had "some" 
juvenile offenses. PSI at 4. Apparently having not learned from his experience in the 
juvenile system, defendant entered the adult criminal system almost immediately after 
attaining his majority. He was convicted of misdemeanor theft and driving under the 
influence at the age of 18.7 PSI at 4. Less than two months after completing probation, 
defendant pled guilty to felony theft. Id. His prison sentence of zero-to-five years was 
suspended and he was placed on probation for three years. Id. However, less than eight 
months later, defendant was convicted often counts of forgery and sentenced to zero-to-five 
years in the Utah State Prison. Id. After serving almost one year in prison, defendant was 
released on parole. Id. at 6. Just over one year later, defendant was again convicted of 
felony theft and receiving stolen property and was sentenced to prison terms of zero-to-five 
defendant's date of birth is April 13, 1962. PSI at 1. 
11 
years each.8 Id. at 4. Thereafter, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") revoked 
defendant's parole on the forgery counts. Id. at 6. Defendant served another year and a half 
in prison before the Board again released him on parole. Id. Defendant was able to stay out 
of prison for almost two years. However, in 1988, defendant was convicted of burglary of 
a dwelling, a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. Id. at 5. He was 
sentenced to a prison term of zero-to-five years on the burglary charge and one-to-fifteen 
years on the theft charge. Id. His parole was subsequently revoked and he served almost 
three more years in prison before being released on parole in 1991. Id. at 6. After being 
released on parole in 1991, defendant was free from the criminal system for three years and 
his sentence was successfully terminated in 1994. Id. The following year, however, 
defendant was convicted of alcohol-related reckless driving and sentenced to 20 days in jail. 
Id. at 5. In 1997, defendant was convicted of domestic violence. Id. 
Citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), defendant also claims on appeal that 
the contract investigator who prepared the PSI improperly considered every arrest, whether 
or not prosecuted, and that the court erroneously relied on that arrest record in imposing 
sentence.9 Aplt. Brf. at 13. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the PSI did not mislead the 
8It is not evident from the record whether the prison terms were consecutive or 
concurrent. 
9Defendant claims that the investigator misconstrued the arrest record, in large part 
due to his alleged bias against defendant due to the fact he was a jailor where defendant 
had been in jail. Aplt. Brf. at 7, 13. Although defendant alleged the investigator's bias at 
sentencing, the only facts in the presentence report which he questioned concerned the 
February 20, 1981 record reflecting five charges. TOS at 3. The PSI indicated the 
following: the State declined to prosecute one count of burglary charge and one count of 
12 
court regarding defendant's criminal record. The PSI disclosed arrests for thirty-two 
different crimes, six of which resulted in felony convictions and four of which resulted in 
misdemeanor convictions. PSI at 9. The PSI specifically advised the court that "[t]here have 
been 22 crimes, including [fjelonies and [misdemeanors which have not been prosecuted 
for various reasons." PSI at 9. Defendant's criminal history is, in any event, much worse 
than that of the defendant in Galli, where the defendant's criminal history consisted of only 
minor traffic offenses and a misdemeanor theft conviction. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
In any event, the supreme court has implied that because a trial court has broad 
discretion in sentencing, it can consider the arrest record of the defendant. See State v. 
McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1986). One jurisdiction has held that "[although an 
arrest record is not evidence of prior criminal history, '[tjhis information is relevant to the 
court's assessment of the defendant's character and the risk that he will commit another 
crime and is therefore properly considered by a court in determining sentence.'" Miller v. 
State, 709 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Ind. App. 1999) (citations omitted). 
3. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Character. 
In addition to defendant's criminal record, the PSI also revealed an extensive history 
of substance abuse. Defendant began drinking at the age of 15. PSI at 7. Defendant was 
theft; a second burglary charge was dismissed; defendant received one year probation on 
a misdemeanor theft charge; and defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail and fined 
$200 for driving under the influence. PSI at 4. Defendant's only comment regarding this 
record was that he did not remember "[djecline to prosecute, one year probation" 
occurring. TOS at 3. However, he acknowledged that because it occurred 15 years ago, 
he may simply not have remembered the incident. Id. Having failed to demonstrate any 
bias or error, defendant's claim of bias is without merit. 
13 
reportedly under the influence of alcohol when he committed the burglary and theft in 1988. 
Id. Defendant reported having an alcohol abuse problem until his three-year incarceration 
from 1988 to 1991.10 Id. Although defendant's criminal record revealed only one early 
arrest for a drug-related crime (which was subsequently dismissed), the PSI revealed a much 
more extensive drug problem. Id. at 4, 8. Defendant started smoking marijuana at the age 
of 16 and progressed to harder drugs (methamphetamine) at the age of 18. Id. at 8. Although 
defendant denied abusing drugs at the present, he admitted to using methamphetamine on a 
weekly basis. Id. Additionally, even though defendant claimed he only used 
methamphetamine, he admitted that he sold drugs to obtain other drugs. Id. In short, 
defendant has abused alcohol and drugs for twenty years. 
Aside from defendant's substance abuse history, the PSI provided additional 
information regarding defendant's character. The PSI revealed that defendant dropped out 
of high school in the tenth grade in part because he was involved in drugs. Id. at 7. 
Although defendant was unable to provide a complete account of his employment history, 
he reported a very unstable employment record in the past year, holding five jobs in just over 
a year. Id. at 8. He was fired from his last reported job after six months for violating 
company rules. Id. In 1996, the Division of Family Services removed from his home and 
placed for adoption his natural born child and a step-child. Id. at 6. Defendant points out in 
his brief that he has expressed a desire to obtain his GED in the future. Aplt. Brf. at 15; PSI 
Defendant denied drinking alcohol since his marriage in 1995. PSI at 7. 
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at 7. However, while expressing the desire to obtain his GED, the PSI indicates that 
defendant "has no immediate plans do so." PSI at 7. 
Defendant also argues that unlike the defendant in Galli, he did not flee from justice. 
Aplt. Brf. at 15. This fact, however, can hardly be counted as a credit to defendant's 
character inasmuch as he remained in the custody of the State since his arrest.11 Defendant 
never had Galli's opportunity to flee from justice.12 Moreover, the sentence in Galli was 
much harsher than defendant's sentence. Galli was sentenced to three consecutive terms of 
five years to life, resulting in a minimum term of fifteen years. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. In 
this case, defendant's sentence only results in a minimum term of three years. Accordingly, 
absent mitigating circumstances which may justify an even earlier release, see infra, at 16, 
the Board has the "unfettered discretion" to release defendant after only three years of 
incarceration. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). 
uDefendant was arrested on October 21, 1998 with bail set at $20,000. 181R. 5-7. 
The minute entry in the docket indicates that on November 4, 1998, the court denied 
defendant's request that he be released on his own recognizance and ordered that bail 
remain at $20,000. Docket Minute Entry, November 4, 1998. Nothing in the record 
indicates that defendant ever posted bail and the trial court recommended at sentencing 
that defendant "receive credit for all the time he's been in jail awaiting 
senteneing-awaiting disposition." TOS at 9. 
12The State does not suggest that defendant necessarily would have absconded 
from justice had he been released on bail or on his own recognizance. However, because 
he was incarcerated pending disposition, the fact that he did not abscond cannot be 
credited to his character. 
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4. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's 
Rehabilitative Needs. 
Defendant contends that the PSI did not properly consider his rehabilitative needs. 
Aplt. Brf. at 16. Yet, a review of the PSI reveals otherwise: 
The defendant's need for substance abuse treatment will not be 
negatively effected by the imposition of a consecutive sentence. Substance 
abuse treatment and counseling are available in the prison system and the 
defendant's progress in these programs and his future treatment needs will be 
considered by the Board of Pardons and Parole. The defendant may also 
benefit from vocational and education programs offered in a more structured 
environment. 
PSI at 10. Defendant asserts, without any support, that the "prison does not have the same 
type of programs and substance abuse treatment available on the outside." Aplt. Brf. at 17. 
Whether or not the assertion is accurate, there is no dispute that the prison is equipped for 
treating inmates with substance abuse problems and there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the prison programs are less effective than those offered outside the prison. Indeed, the 
prison treatment programs may very well be more effective, since treatment in prison takes 
place in a highly controlled environment where access to alcohol or drugs is presumably 
much more difficult. As defendant himself reported, he would like to participate in substance 
abuse counseling "just so [he] can stay away from it." PSI at 8. The prison will offer such 
an opportunity. 
Defendant suggests that under Strunk, the imposition of consecutive prison terms 
deprives the Board of its discretion to release him early if his progress in rehabilitation so 
warrants. Aplt. Brf. at 15. In Strunk, however, the court sentenced the defendant to life 
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imprisonment for first degree murder and consecutive minimum mandatory terms of fifteen 
years to life for child kidnapping and nine years to life for aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1298. The supreme court vacated the consecutive sentences which would 
have resulted in the defendant's incarceration for no less than 24 years. Id. at 1301-02. 
Unlike the case in Strunk, defendant in this case was sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. 
Under section 77-27-9( 1 )(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1998), the Board may release defendant 
even before the minimum term has been served if mitigating circumstances justify the 
release. Accordingly, notwithstanding the imposition of consecutive sentences, the Board 
still has the discretion to parole defendant sooner than three years if defendant's progress so 
warrants.13 
Even if the sentence resulted in a minimum mandatory term of three years, which it 
does not, the factors the supreme court found compelling in Strunk are not present here. The 
court in Strunk concluded that the trial court had failed to sufficiently consider the absence 
of prior violent crimes and the "extreme youth" of the defendant, who was at the time of the 
offense sixteen years of age. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300, 1302. The 24-year minimum 
mandatory sentence was the equivalent of one and one-half lifetimes of the defendant at that 
I3The supreme court in Galli vacated a sentence requiring the defendant to serve 
three consecutive, indeterminate prison terms of five years to life. 967 P.2d at 938. The 
decision was based in part on the conclusion that concurrent sentences would "allow[] the 
Board of Pardons and Parole to release [Galli] from prison after five years if he has 
shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. This conclusion, however, was based 
on the false premise that a consecutive, indeterminate sentence would foreclose the Board 
from granting an early release. Id. Yet, section 77-29-9 provides the Board with the 
flexibility to parole a defendant before he serves the minimum term of an indeterminate 
sentence if mitigating circumstances justify the early release. 
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time. In contrast, defendant, who was 36 years old at the time of the offense and who has 
been in and out of prison most of his adult life, would be incarcerated for three years or one-
twelfth of his lifetime.14 
Defendant acknowledges that his rehabilitative needs were specifically addressed by 
his attorney at sentencing. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 & n. 3. However, he challenges the sentence 
because the court did not discuss those needs when it pronounced the sentence. Aplt. Brf. 
at 16-17. The statute only requires the court to consider the statutory factors, not that it 
discuss them at sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). That the court considered 
these factors is evident from the fact that it was the court, not counsel for defendant, who 
deemed it necessary to order a PSI before imposing sentence. Docket Minute Entry, 
December 23, 1998. Defendant has not pointed to any evidence indicating that the court 
failed to read the report or consider the relevant factors. Defendant simply argues that the 
Court should give greater weight to certain factors. If the Court were to do so, however, it 
would merely be substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Such is not the duty of 
this Court. 
In short, the court duly considered each of the statutory factors, and, in light of those 
factors, imposition of consecutive prison terms was reasonable and within the broad 
discretion of the trial court. 
14Obviously, the gravity and circumstances of the offense in Strunk, which 
involved the brutal murder of a six-year old girl, were more compelling than those in this 
case. 846 P.2d at 1299-1300. However, the court in Strunk focused on defendant's 
young age and lack of criminal history, factors not present here. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
the trial court's sentence ordering defendant to serve consecutive prison terms of one-to-
fifteen years on each of the three offenses to which defendant pleaded. 
Respectfully submitted this ZJ day of August, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEFFREY S. GRAY s/ 
(^ASSISTANT ATTORNBYGENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
Region VI,, Moab 
1165 South Highway 191, Suite 3 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-3790 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: 01/15/99 
Sentencing Date: 01/20/99 
JUDGE LYLE R. ANDERSON SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
MOAB GRAND UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: Kelly Mark Laxton 
ALIASES: Kelly Mack Laxton 
ADDRESS: 589 Locust Lane 
Moab, Utah 84532 
BIRTHDATE: 04/13/62 AGE: 
BIRTHPLACE: Moab, Utah 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: Utah 
MARITAL STATUS: Divorced 
INTERPRETER NEEDED: No 
36 
COURT CASE NOS: 981700181, 182, & 183 
OBSCISNO: 00005129 
CO-DEFENDANTS: None 
OFFENSE: Dist/Offer/Arr. To Distribute 
Controlled Substance, 2nd Degree Felony 
PLEA: Guilty DATE: 12/16/98 
PROS. ATTORNEY: William L. Benge 
DEF. ATTORNEY: Happy Morgan 
PLEA BARGATN: On October 19,1998, the Grand County Attorney's Office filed three different 
Criminal Informations against the defendant in the Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, 
State of Utah. Information No. 9817-181 was filed for one count of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony. Information No. 9817-182 was filed for one 
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PLEA BARGATN: (Continued) count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free 
Zone, a First Degree Felony. Information No. 9817-183 was filed for one count of Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony. As a result of plea negotiations, 
the defendant entered a guilty plea to three counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Second 
Degree Felonies. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court. 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: The are three separate cases involved in this matter. Each 
case will be detailed for review. 
Case No- SF98-57: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Mallon was contacted on August 24,1998 at 1240 hours 
by a Confidential Informant and advised that arrangements had been made to buy Methamphetamine 
from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. At 1540 hours the same date, a controlled buy supervised by Sgt. 
Mallon took place. The defendant, Kelly Laxton, sold a purported .50 grams of Methamphetamine 
to the C.I. for $40. The sale of the drugs took place at the Laxton residence, 589 Bowen Circle. A 
warrant was obtained and the defendant was arrested on October 21, 1998 for Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony and booked into the Grand County 
Jail. 
Case # SF98-60: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Scott Mallon was contacted on August 26, 1998 at 1330 
hours by Confidential Informants from the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force and advised that 
arrangements had been made to buy Methamphetamine from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. At 1554 
hours that same day, Kelly Laxton sold a purported .50 grams of Methamphetamine for $50 to the 
CI. at 589 Bowen Circle, the Laxton residence. The controlled buy was supervised by Sgt. Mallon. 
A warrant was obtained for Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First 
Degree Felony, and the defendant was arrested and booked into the Grand County Jail on October 
21, 1998. 
Case # SF98-62: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Mallon was contacted at 1455 hours on August 28, 1998 
by a Confidential Informant and informed that an arrangement had been made to buy 
Methamphetamine from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. Mr. Laxton sold a purported 1.75 grams of 
Methamphetamine for $120 to Confidential Informants from the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force. 
The sale of the drugs occurred at the Laxton residence located at 589 Bowen Circle. The controlled 
buy was supervised by Sgt. Scott Mallon. A warrant was obtained for Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony, and the defendant was subsequently arrested 
and booked into the Grand County Jail on October 21,1998. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Moab City Police CaseNo.s SF98-57, SF98- 60, SF98-62, Grand 
County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court. 
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DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: Mr. Laxton provided the following handwritten, 
signed version of the offense, which is typed verbatim: 
Oct 21 the police broke down the door at my moms house @ 6:30 am. 
/s/ Kelly Laxton. Date: 1/6/99 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS. There are no co-defendants in this case. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: There are no victims in this case. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court. 
RESTITJIIIQN: Restitution in this case has been requested by the Grand/San Juan Drug Task 
Force for reimbursement of expenses incurred for the purchase of the controlled substances and 
payment of the Confidential Informants for their services. 
COURT CASE # COUNT # VICTIM AMOUNT 
9817-181 1 Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force $170.00 
9817-182 2 Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force 90.00 
9817-183 3 Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force 100.00 
Total $360.00 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Moab Police Department Case No.s SF98-57, SF98-60, and 
SF98-62. 
CUSTODY STATUS: The defendant remains in custody at the Grand County Jail awaiting 
sentencing on these matters. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Jail. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: This agency did not request input from law 
enforcement concerning this case. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION : Department of Corrections files. 
JUVENILE RECORD: The defendant stated he has some juvenile offenses in his past, however 
he can not remember the dates. The defendant stated to this investigator he had been sent to the 
Boy's Ranch in Mapleton, Utah and the State School in Ogden, Utah, as a result of juvenile offenses. 










Utah Hwy Patrol 
MoabPD 
OFFENSE 
Poss. Stolen Property 
Burglary 
Burglary 
Theft, Class B 
Theft 
DUI 
Poss. Controlled Sub. 
Theft 
DISPOSITION 
Decline to Prosecute 
Decline to Prosecute 
Dismissed 
1 Year Probation 
Decline to Prosecute 
180 Days; $200 Fine 
Dismissed 
Guilty Sentenced USP 0-5 
3 Years Probation 
12/01/82 Moab PD Forgery (10 Counts) 
Forgery (2 Counts) 
0-5 Utah State Prison 
Dismissed 
12/06/84 Moab PD Felony Theft 
Rec. Stolen Property 
0-5 Utah Sate Prison 
0-5 Utah State Prison 
10/09/86 MoabPD Misd. Theft Dismissed 
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Burglary (12 Counts) 
Theft (12 Counts) 




Felon in Poss. of Firearm 
Misd. Theft 
Burglary of Vehicle 
Theft 
Burglary of a Dwelling 
Theft, 2nd Degree Felony 
DISPOSITION 
Dismissed (11 Counts) 









0-5 Utah State Prison 









Cortez, Colo PD 
Grand Co. SO 
Grand Co. SO 
Grand Co. SO 
Grand Co. SO 
Grand Co. SO 
Grand Co. SO 
Moab,UtPD 






Extradite to Utah 
Reduce to Alcohol Reckless 
20 Days, $500 Fine 
No Info. Available 
Dismissed 
Dismissed 
6 Months in Jail; $300 Fine 
Violation of Protective Order No Information Available 
Distribute Controlled Sub. PRESENT OFFENSE 
(3 Cases) 2nd Deg. Felony 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah Criminal History File No. 00194114; Colorado Criminal 
History File No. 676739; FBI File no. 676325X5; Interstate Identification Index; Utah Statewide 
Warrants; NCIC; Presentence Investigation Packet. 
DRIVING HISTORY: Records indicate the defendant has a current Utah Commercial Driver's 
License No. 148164881. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah Driver's License Query. 
PENDING CASES: There appear to be no criminal cases pending against the defendant at this time. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Seventh District Court 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: Records indicate the defendant was first placed on one year 
probation on April 20,1981, which he successfully completed. The defendant was committed to the 
Utah State Prison on December 20, 1982 and released on parole November 21, 1983. The parole 
was revoked January 4,1985 and the defendant was again incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He 
was granted parole again on July 8, 1986, which was revoked on May 13, 1988 and the defendant 
was again returned to the Utah State Prison. The defendant was granted parole a third time on April 
23,1991 and his sentence was terminated successfully on May 11,1994. In summary, the defendant 
has been granted the privilege of probation one time which he successfully completed. He has been 
paroled from the Utah State Prison three different times, returning to prison for new offenses two 
of those times and successfully completing the third parole on May 11,1994. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. Department of Corrections Files. 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Kelly Mark Laxton is 36 years old, 
the youngest child of Homer D. and Lynda H. Laxton, born in Moab, Utah. The defendant's 
parents divorced when he was approximately three years of age. He was raised by his mother and 
attended Grand County Schools, dropping out in the 10th grade because he was bored with school 
and was involved with drugs. Kelly married Laura Cave on July 21, 1995 in Moab. They divorced 
in November of 1997. One child was born to this union. The child, along with a step-child were 
removed from the home and placed for adoption by the Division of Family Services in 1996. Mr. 
Laxton has no contact with either his father or his daughter. The defendant has spent approximately 
five years of his adult life confined in the Utah State Prison. He is a truck driver and mechanic by 
trade and was living with his mother at the time he was arrested for the present offense. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
MARITAL HISTORY: Kelly married Laura Cave on July 21,1995 and they divorced in November 
of 1997. He is presently planning to marry Theresa Brune in January or February of 1999. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
EDUCATION: The defendant attended Grand County Schools, dropping out in 10th grade because 
he was involved with drugs and was bored with school. He completed a correspondence course and 
received a certificate in diesel mechanics while incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. He would like 
to obtain his GED in the future although he has no immediate plans to do so. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
GANG AFFILIATIONS: The defendant denies any affiliation with gangs. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: The defendant describes his physical health as good. He was hospitalized 
in 1995 where he underwent surgery to repair a broken jaw he received in a fight. He denies any 
other health problems and is not taking any prescription medication. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
MENTAL HEALTH: The defendant describes his mental health as good. He deals with stress by 
playing cards and sleeping. He denies ever having been referred for psychological counseling and 
denies any suicidal ideation. The defendant has never been on medication for psychological or 
emotional problems and does not feel counseling would benefit him at the present time. The 
defendant denies ever being the victim of any physical or sexual abuse. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
ALCOHOL HISTORY: The defendant began drinking at age 15. He admits past abuse of alcohol, 
drinking all types of alcohol heavily before his last incarceration in the Utah State Prison in 1988. 
The defendant was under the influence of alcohol when he committed a burglary in 1988. The 
defendant denies any alcohol use since his marriage in 1995. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
DRUG HISTORY: The defendant started smoking marijuana at age 16. He progressed to harder 
drugs at age 18, using only Methamphetamine and Marijuana. He describes his current use of 
Methamphetamine as once a week and denies the use of any other drugs. The defendant admits 
selling drugs to obtain other drugs. The defendant feels he has abused drugs in the past, especially 
when his child was taken from his home, but denies abuse at the present time. The defendant would 
like to participate in counseling for substance abuse "just so I can stay away from it." The defendant 
admits that he was under the influence of drugs when he committed the present offenses, but denies 
committing any other offenses while under the influence of drugs. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: The defendant provided an incomplete account of his employment 
history. He has been employed only on spot jobs for the last year. He reports doing mechanic work 
at his home to make money when he is not working elsewhere. 
REASON 
EMPLOYER WAGE TITLE START/END EQR LEAVING 
Billy Hass 10% of Profit Truck Driver 4/98 to 10/98 Fired for Violation of 
Company Rules. 
J.C.Hunt $.23/Mile Truck Driver 7/98 One Trip Only 
Warren Closterman $500 Truck Driver 7/98 One Trip Only 
L.W.Miller Truck Driver 8/97 to 1/98 Lay Off 
LeGrand Johnson Truck Driver Summer 1997 Lay Off. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: The defendant reports no income since his arrest for the present 
offense. Before that, his means of support was occasional mechanic work and spot driving jobs. He 
was residing with his mother who provides his room and board. The defendant reports past due bills 
to Allen Memorial Hospital in the amount of $340. He also reports owing the Division of Family 
Services $7,000 in back child support. The defendant denies ever having anything repossessed or 
filing bankruptcy and has no plans to do so. The defendant owns a 1977 Chevrolet pickup which 
he values at $1,000 and denies ownership of any other real property or assets. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
MILITARY RECORD: The defendant has never served in any branch of the Armed Forces. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: The defendant was asked to provide letters of character reference. 
As of the writing of this report, no letters have been received. If any are received before the 
submission of this report, they will be attached for the Court's review. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: Kelly Mark Laxton, 36 years old, is appearing before the Court for 
sentencing on three cases of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, all Second Degree Felonies. 
The charges resulted from the defendant selling Methamphetamine to Confidential Informants from 
the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force on three separate occasions. The Court asked for the 
completion of the Presentence Investigation with emphasis placed on whether concurrent or 
consecutive sentences should be imposed. 
The defendant, through his counsel, makes a valid argument for concurrent rather than consecutive 
sentences. The points supporting counsel's position have been noted, however the Office of Adult 
Probation and Parole supports the imposition of consecutive sentences in this matter for the 
following reasons. 
The imposition of consecutive sentences does not take away from the wide latitude granted to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole. The category of crimes the defendant has been charged with do not 
require mandatory imprisonment for a specified length of time by statute. The recommendations 
made by the Utah Sentencing Commission in the Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines are 
intended to be guidelines only and do not have any binding effect on the Board of Pardons and 
Parole in considering the length of time a defendant must serve. The Board of Pardons and Parole 
will still retain the authority to release the defendant from confinement when it deems appropriate, 
even though a consecutive sentence has been imposed. 
The statute requires the Court to consider the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant when considering whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Mr. Laxton has 
a lengthy criminal history. He has been arrested and charged with approximately 32 different crimes 
since he turned 18 years of age. Of those 32 offenses, he has been convicted of 6 Felonies and 4 
Misdemeanors. There have been 22 crimes, including Felonies and Misdemeanors which have not 
been prosecuted for various reasons. The defendant has been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison 
on three different occasions, spending approximately five and one-half years of his adult life in 
prison. The defendant has been granted the privilege of probation early in his criminal career. He 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (Continued) completed the first period of probation successfully 
as a youth. While on probation the second time, the defendant committed a felony which resulted 
in his being sent to the Utah State Prison. The defendant has been paroled from prison on three 
different occasions. He has been convicted of new crimes and returned to the Utah State Prison while 
on parole, two of those three times. It should be noted that the defendant has been arrested and 
charged with offenses which include violence, possession of a weapon, and assault with a weapon, 
indicating a propensity for violent behavior, even though prosecution has been declined on some of 
the offenses. 
The defendant admits the abuse of controlled substances and committed the present offenses to 
support his use of them. The defendant's need for substance abuse treatment will not be negatively 
effected by the imposition of a consecutive sentence. Substance abuse treatment and counseling are 
available in the prison system and the defendant's progress in these programs and his future 
treatment needs will be considered by the Board of Pardons and Parole. The defendant may also 
benefit from vocational and education programs offered in a more structured environment. 
The defendant's lengthy criminal history, continued involvement with the criminal justice system, 
lack of the ability to obtain and successfully complete substance abuse treatment on his own, and 
his lack of obtaining steady employment are all factors to be considered by the Court in this matter. 
It is the opinion of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant should receive consecutive 
sentences to allow for a longer period of control of the defendant for the protection of society. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
I si William Christensen 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
/s/ Robert R. Valerio Attachments: 
ROBERT R. VALERIO, SUPERVISOR Matrix 
REECQMMENDATTON 
It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant, Kelly 
Mark Laxton, Court Case No.s 9817-181,9817-182, and 9817-183, be sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison according to statute and that the sentences be ordered to run consecutively. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
/s/ William Chrisfensen 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
/s/Robert R.Valerio 
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1 I  THE COURT: All right, we have Kelly Laxton's case 
2 then, first on the criminal calendar. The case is 9817182 
3 and 183 and 181. I have the pre-sentence report. Are there 
4 factual inaccuracies in the report, Ms. Morgan? 
5 MS. MORGAN: There's only one that Mr. Laxton would 
6 like to point out to the Court. The arrest, or the notation 
7 on his adult record, 2-20-81, there are five charges there. 
8 It says, "Decline to prosecute, one year probation." Mr. 
9 Laxton does not remember that occurring. It was more than 
10 15 years ago, and so, it is possible that he doesn't 
11 remember—he suggested that to me—but he doesn't believe 
12 that that—those instances occurred. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. I've heard quite a bit from both of 
14 You o n the recommendation, but I'll give you each a change 
15 to address the recommendation again. 
16 MS. MORGAN: Urn— 
17 THE COURT: I've heard your own recommendations; of 
18 course, you've just now seen the recommendation from the 
19 investigator. 
20 MS. MORGAN: Well, Your Honor, I did submit a motion to 
21 the Court regarding Mr. Laxton's sentencing and the 
22 appropriateness of consecutive rather than concurrent terms, 
23 based on his plea agreement, and I still feel—we came back 
24 the last time and the Court sent this over to adult 
25 probation and parole, and I just don't feel that this report 
I 
4 
1 addresses all the considerations that are in the statute. 
2 It does address his criminal history, but it doesn't really 
3 go to the gravity of the circumstances of these particular 
4 instances—Mr. Laxton's character, in general. And I don't 
5 really feel like you're paying enough attention to his 
6 rehabilitative needs. And I'm concerned with the overall, 
7 sort of, I don't know, view of the person who prepared this 
8 report. As the Court has been made aware in the past, this 
9 probation officer is also a jailer at the Monticello jail. 
10 And though, you know, I'm certainly not one to, you know, 
11 claim conspiracy theories in Court, I'm just concerned that 
12 a jailer isn't an appropriate person to be judging someone 
13 like Mr. Laxton. 
14 It's our hope, when we get a report from adult 
15 probation and parole, that we get someone who is somewhat in 
16 the middle and—and not on the prosecution's side or on the 
17 —and the jail's side, per se, of a set of circumstances 
18 like this. And I think that this report shows someone who 
19 comes more from that side than from the middle, where we 
20 would like to see a probation officer being. 
21 He counts all of Kelly's 32 arrests, and he does note 
22 that over 20 of those were dismissed or, for whatever 
23 reason, not prosecuted, but he seems to work on the premise 
24 that, well, he was probably guilty of those things anyway. 



























because of his arrest record, but yet, in the evaluation 
summary, he's giving no credit for the fact that 22 of those 
have been dismissed. In fact, it suggests that we need to 
be careful about Mr. Laxton being out in society because he 
had all of these, suggesting that those 22, perhaps he got 
away scot-free, but he actually did them. 
And so, I'm just concerned that—that this evaluator 
hasn't been unbiased and that he brought his own personal 
opinions, as a jailer, in making this report, and that 
Mr. Laxton hasn't had a fair opportunity to have all the 
things that the statute points out should be considered, 
considered by this report. 
So, I'm asking the Court sentence him to just one term, 
or that the terms run concurrently rather than 
consecutively. It gives the prison the appropriate amount 
of time to determine what he needs, in terms of 
rehabilitation. Certainly, they'll have him, at a minimum, 
for a year, and they can keep him there for 15 years, if 
they decide that that's what they need to do. 
The prison does not have the programs and the substance 
abuse treatment that Mr. Laxton could get on the outside. 
If he puts in a year and his behavior is excellent, I would 
like him to have the opportunity to go to a halfway house, 
or drug treatment program, if that's appropriate. But if 



























parole, that won't be possible, and I just don't think that 
that's fair in this case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laxton, do have anything you'd like to 
add to what your attorney has said, or anything you'd like 
to say? 
MR. LAXTON: Well, just on the—Mr. Christensen did do 
a report and stuff. He was the jailer down there, when I 
was in jail down there in v91, before I got released from 
prison the last time, and he does know me. 
THE COURT: Oh, so you that, as a—under the contract 
of the State, you were in the State Prison, but serving in 
Monticello? 
MR. LAXTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: ~Kay. So he knows you? 
MR. LAXTON: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MORGAN: And this is the first time that Mr. Laxton 
has made me aware of that fact, but I would certainly argue 
that that adds into my concern that this jailer has a 
predisposed notion about this gentleman, and that is shown 
in his recommendations here. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, just briefly, I—I guess Ms. 
Morgan's arguments that a person who happens to have another 
position as a jailer, in a different county, should not be 
I 
7 
1 || able to perform a pre-sentence report, because he'd be 
2 || biased on behalf of law enforcement. This doesn't fall on— 
3 I on my ears very well. 
4|| I guess, under the same theory, probation officers, who 
5 || are sworn police officers, who carry a badge and carry a 
6 || <jun, should also not be able to prepare probation reports, 
7 "cause they would be sympathetic to law enforcement, also. 
8 So, therefore, maybe we ought to ship all of our pre-
9 sentence report to the social services, or some—some other 
10 agency that would be more warm and fuzzy, but that's not— 
11 that's not the way the law is. 
12 Your Honor, there's nothing substantive that would show 
13 that the person who prepared this report has any bias. Your 
14 Honor, based on Mr. Laxton's past history—and I have 
15 personal knowledge of most of that myself, so I guess—I 
16 guess I'm prejudice, too. But, quite frankly, I don't want 
17 to see Mr. Laxton out in a halfway house in a year, and I 
18 certainly don't want to see him back in Moab in a—in a 
19 short period of time. 
20 Mr. Laxton's been a menace on this community, he's been 
21 selling drugs within 200 feet of a school, and I think he 
22 should be sentenced consecutively. I'll submit it on that 
23 basis. 
24 THE COURT: Any legal reason why the sentence should 
25 not be imposed? 
8 
1 || MS. MORGAN: None, Your Honor. 
2 I  THE COURT: It's the judgment sentence of this Court 
3 that the Defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison 
4 for a term of not less than one, nor more than 15 years, on 
5 each of these charges, and I order that the sentences be 
6 served consecutively. 
7 The reason I'm ordering consecutive sentences, rather 
8 than concurrent sentences, which are usually presumed, is 
9 that the Defendant has been sentenced to prison on three 
10 J previous occasions and, apparently, either served out his 
H time or persuaded authorities that he would not resume 
12 criminal activity once he was released from prison and, yet, 
13 the evidence is that each time he has resumed criminal 
14 activity. And so, it's pretty clear that with Mr. Laxton, 
15 we're in a situation where we just have to keep him in 
16 prison as long as we can. And I know he's competing for 
17 beds with other people who need to be imprisoned, because 
18 they—they will commit crimes when they get out, but I think 
19 | it's important to state, with respect to this Defendant, 
20 who's going back to prison now for the fourth time, that we 
21 want them to keep him there, at least give him a priority 
22 f°r keeping him in there. 
23 According to the matrix, even with this, he will spend 
24 four and a half years in prison with this sentence, and that 
25 is not too much, given his history. 
I 
9 
So, that's the—let's see, I don't—were you asking for 
any restitution in this case? 
MR. BENGE: I— 
THE COURT: I didn't see it in the recommendations, and 
I don't remember you asking for it. 
MR. BENGE: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. He's remanded to the custody of 
the sheriff to be transported to the Utah State Prison to 
serve his sentence. He'll receive credit for all the time 
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